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Blood Money: Incentives for Violence in NHL Hockey
Abstract
The level of violence in the National Hockey League (NHL) reached its high-
est point in 1987 and has reduced somewhat since then, although to levels
much larger than before the first team expansions in 1967. Using publicly
available information from several databases 1996–2007, the incentives for
violence in North American ice hockey are analyzed.We examine the role of
penalty minutes and more specifically, fighting, during the regular season in
determining wages for professional hockey players and team-level success in-
dicators. There are substantial returns paid not only to goal scoring skills but
also to fighting ability,helping teams move higher in the playoffs and showing
up as positive wage premia for otherwise observed low-skill wing players.
These estimated per-fight premia, depending on fight success ($10,000 to
$18,000), are even higher than those for an additional point made. By intro-
ducing a “fight fine”of twice the maximum potential gain ($36,000) and add-
ingthisamounttosalariespaidfortheteamsalarycap(fineswouldbe6.7%of
the team salary cap or the average wage of 2 players),then all involved would
have either little or no incentives to allow fighting to continue.
JEL Classification:J31,J81,C23
Keywords: Compensating wage differentials, health risk, violence, subjective
indicators
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The economic literature concerning incentives in professional ice hockey is
relatively sparse. There are some papers concerning salary determination
and the role of discrimination between English and French speaking hockey
players in Canada as found in Longley (1995) or with respect to strategic
behavior (shirking) by players once having signed a long-term contract as
in Grabowiecki (2008). However, once on the ice, hockey players may have
incentives to break oﬃcial ice hockey rules with the explicit aim of achieving
speciﬁc performance goals, as shown in Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh (1997).
Violence has always been an integral part of the game of ice hockey. However,
what does violence in hockey really have to do with a modern multi-million
dollar industry that relies on healthy players performing so that stadium
tickets (see Jones, Ferguson, and Stewart (1993)) and television cable/pay-
per-view/rebroadcast rights can be sold, player endorsed merchandise sold
and hockey fans being entertained? Some limited violence is seen as “letting
of steam” by fans, players and owners, whereas other spectacular incidents
have seen career-ending injuries or even criminal charges being laid against
the antagonists have been publicly condemned. Even the old Canadian adage
as to “why the ice hockey rink surface is white”1 gives a hint as to the role
of violence in the professional sport.
Some suggest that as early as 1955 when Bill Warwick and his brothers
Grant Warwick and Dick Warwick with their aggressive hockey style won
the World Championship for Canada as the “Penticton Vees” against the
Soviet Union, that tastes for rougher and more violent hockey were in gen-
eral developing amongst hockey fans. This was not just hockey, this was the
cold war (on ice). Similarly in Game 8 of the famous international match
Canada-Russia in September 1972, violence even threatened to extend to the
oﬃciating staﬀ, as Canadian player Jean-Paul Paris´ e threatened to assault a
referee for his perceived bad calls during the game by skating toward a referee
whilst carrying a raised hockey stick in a tomahawk manner and threatening
to hit the referee over the head. Paris´ e aborted the assault ultimately but
the assault would have resulted in severe cranial trauma for the referee had
Paris´ e carried out his threat. This was probably an example of a response
“in the heat of the moment”, however there are other motives, such as en-
forcement, and protecting the teams’ investment in human capital of prize
(and expensive) players. In 1944 Bob “Killer” Dill was put on the ice with
1That is, of course, for a spectator to be able to see blood resulting from a ﬁght even
30 rows up in the stands.
4the purpose of attacking Maurice “Rocket” Richard, perhaps the best player
in the game at the time, indicating that violence was being used strategi-
cally. Whilst the hockey legend (and highly paid) Wayne Gretzky played
for the team Edmonton Oilers in the 1980’s, his team-mate Marty McSorely
eﬀectively acted as his enforcer, protecting Gretzky from other teams’ fouls
(and potential injury) and allowing Gretzky to score many goals. Very rarely
was Gretzky himself involved in penalties or violent behavior; however his
teammate McSorely was all the more involved and was eventually suspended
from the league.
According to Oﬃcial Rules of the National Hockey League (2007), more
than half of the rules deal with on-ice penalties, their severity and their
types (physical, restraining, stick and other fouls). The severity of penalties
typically reﬂects the potential harm done to the victim of the foul. The
minimum assessment for on-ice penalties is two minutes. During such time,
the oﬀending player is required to leave the ice for this time period without
another player taking his place. This is clearly a detriment to his team, as
with one player fewer on the ice compared to the other team, the oﬀending
team is at a disadvantage and more likely to have a goal scored against them.
More severe penalties, such as ﬁghting, start with ﬁve minutes, with an even
greater chance of having a goal scored against the oﬀending side, but are
open ended to include multiple match suspensions or even complete disbar-
ment. In an attempt to curb bench-clearing brawls (in which all players leave
the benches and ﬁght each other), the penalties for ﬁghting were increased
to include game suspensions and ﬁnes in 2005 for ﬁghts taking part in the
last 5 minutes of play. This is also reinforced with Rule 43 “Intent to Injure”.
Levitt (2002) and Heckelman and Yates (2003) examine the role of addi-
tional referees in enforcing NHL rules. In the 1999-2000 hockey season, some
games were oﬃciated by two referees, rather than the usual one referee. It
was thought that with the additional referee, there would be additional en-
forcement potential and an increased deterrent eﬀect. However, using IV
estimation, Heckelman and Yates (2003) show that the number of referees
indeed does not aﬀect the number of infractions committed. They conclude
that most infractions (penalties) are “accidental or retaliatory in nature”
and “more analogous to a crime of passion than a calculated beneﬁt-cost
analysis performed by a rational criminal”. Levitt (2002) comes to a similar
conclusion. Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh (1997) use only information from the
89-90 hockey season but do not have explicit information on ﬁght behavior,
but rather only penalty minutes in general. They attempt to cluster players
into “enforcers” and “non-enforcers” using variables correlated with ﬁghting,
5whilst having no information on ﬁghting itself. They conclude that “en-
forcers” have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent coeﬃcients in a wage regression, and are
paid lower than otherwise expected salaries, due to their lack of bargaining
power.
At the player level, players who engage in violent behavior do so at risk
to themselves. The player can “win” a ﬁght in such a manner that the “ﬁght
winner” does more damage to the “ﬁght loser” than is true in reverse. Fight-
ing outcomes are not certain and there is a percentage of the time that even
good ﬁghters lose. Thus one might think of paid “enforcers” as having a role
in protecting the very good players by ﬁghting and winning in addition to
taking on the risk of ﬁghting and losing. The empirical question is whether
ﬁghting is rewarded at all, and if so, is winning the ﬁght rewarded diﬀerently
than losing. One might think of the potential wage premium for winning
ﬁghts as simply a reward for doing what they are paid to do, with little
personal costs to the ﬁghter. However, when the ﬁghters lose, it is often at
great personal risk of injury, and must be compensated ﬁnancially. The lit-
erature for compensating wage diﬀerentials is summarized, among others, by
Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990) and Purse (2004). In a study analyzing work
related accidents, Meng (1989) ﬁnds positive and signiﬁcant wage premia for
working in risky industries in Canada. While the risk of death on the job in
ice hockey is extremely rare, the risk of personal injury in a ﬁght is immedi-
ate. Also, do ﬁghts (won, lost or neither) improve the chances of the team
in reaching the playoﬀs or winning the championship?
While most of previously done work on wage diﬀerentials focuses on fatal
injuries, the situation for non-fatal injuries is diﬀerent. Lucas (1977) and Ol-
son (1981) ﬁnd signiﬁcant wage eﬀects for working under extreme/dangerous
conditions in cross-sectional analyses, which were moderated to some extent
by personal and demographic characteristics. As workers choose their jobs
not only because of monetary compensation but also according to their indi-
vidual preferences. The paid wage premium is directly linked to the accident
frequency and accident severity. Diﬀerence in risk premiums can occur be-
cause of (1) diﬀerent worker characteristics lead to diﬀerent risk-producing
qualities, (2) diﬀerent wage premiums for the same risk. To address these
issues, we will control for individual player and team ﬁxed eﬀects. Additional
work by Dorsey and Walzer (1983) shows that the amount of compensation
depends on the extent to which the employer is liable for the workplace risk.
Using a unique data base of players in National Hockey League (NHL)
teams 1996-2007, and a team level database for all NHL teams 1967-2005,
6we examine the role of penalty minutes and more speciﬁcally, ﬁghting, in
determining wages for professional hockey players and team-level success in-
dicators. As players’ wages, personal attributes and success indicators in the
NHL are eﬀectively public knowledge, we can quite readily determine whether
compensating diﬀerentials are paid for ﬁghters, or whether the “bad boys”
are eﬀectively punished monetarily. Also we can analyze whether teams with
high levels of penalty minutes of ﬁghting behavior are more successful in
reaching the championship. The aim of this is paper is to analyze the role of
on-the-ice violence as a characteristic of the work environment in which pro-
fessional hockey players are gainfully employed. There appears to be some
new evidence to suggest that player behavior with respect to fouling and
using violence at the team or player level is more strategic than otherwise
previously thought.
2 Empirical Application
The data was gathered from a variety of online resources. The main resources
were the “HockeyDB Project”, “Drop Your Gloves” and “Hockey-Fights”2
websites on the internet. These sites are supported by hockey fans and collect
data from various sources, including the NHL Player’s Association, newspa-
pers and oﬃcial league statistics.
Figure 1 shows the average level of total team penalty minutes per season
and its development over time. Penalty minutes increase from around 750
in 1967 to about three times that ﬁgure at the peak of violent behavior in
the the NHL in 1987. After which, the total penalty minutes has been eﬀec-
tively in decline to around 1200 in 2005. At the same time, there have been
distribution changes in penalty minutes. As the number of teams steadily
increased through several league expansions, penalty minute dispersion also
increased as seen in Figure 2. Now examining the average number of ﬁghts
that teams were involved with, as shown in Figure 3, and the respective dis-
tributions in Figure 4, we see the peak in 1987 with a maximal amount in
variation, slowly reducing in 2005 to about half of the peak level of 1987 and
a distinct tightening of the variance. It is diﬃcult to identify the reason for
the peak in 1987 and the substantial reduction ever since. However in Jan-
uary 1988, for the ﬁrst time, a player had criminal charges pressed against
2See hockeydb.com, dropyourgloves.com and hockeyﬁghts.com for more information.
We would especially like to thank David M. Singer from hockeyﬁghts.com for his help in
the preliminary analysis.
7him and was convicted, spending one day in jail and ﬁned $1,000. The Min-
nesota player Dino Ciccarelli had taken his stick and hit the Toronto player
Luke Richardson in the head repeatedly. This might have been a trigger,
prompting players to reduce ﬂagrant violence, as it was now seen to riskier
with respect to criminal consequences.
The data is particularly interesting as, in addition to team success and
salary information, it contains a collection of objective indicators, such as
goals scored, assists made, an on-ice plus-minus real time indicator, number
of ﬁghts and total penalty minutes and subjective success indicators such
as whether one actually “clearly won” the ﬁghts that one was involved in.
The informational content of subjective indicators is well documented in eco-
nomics such as in Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), DiTella, MacCul-
loch, and Oswald (2001) and Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields (2004).
At the team level, the outcome variable is how successful the team was
during each season by surviving at least to the: playoﬀs, quarter ﬁnals, semi
ﬁnals, ﬁnals and having won the Stanley Cup championship. We have the
regular season percentage of games won, number of points, number of ﬁghts,
and number of ﬁghts “clearly won”.
At the team level, we use a series of conditional logit models taking team
ﬁxed eﬀects (αj) and season ﬁxed eﬀects (δt) into account:
LEV ELjt = βXjt + γVjt + δt + αj + εjt (1)
where LEV ELjt is interpreted as the j’th team having in time t reached
a certain playoﬀ level or above: (a) having at least reached the playoﬀs, (b)
having at least reached the quarter ﬁnals, (c) having at least reached the
semi ﬁnals, (d) having at least reached the ﬁnals and (e) having won the
championship. In total, we run 5 conditional (binary) logits (a)-(e), where
Xjt consists of information coming from the regular seasons only: total team
goals scored, total team goals allowed in, percentage of games won. Vjt con-
tains a measure of violent behavior: one of total team penalty minutes, total
team number of ﬁghts and total team number of ﬁghts won.
At the player level, we observe 2216 players (excluding goalkeepers), play-
ing in 30 teams starting from the 1996/1997 season until 2007/2008. This
amounts to a total of 9806 person-year observations. For 2056 observations
salary data is missing/not available.
8Our main model at the player level is a wage regression of the following
form:
SALARYijt = βXijt + γVijt + αi + αj + δt + εijt (2)
The salary (US$) of a player i, playing for team j in season t is the de-
pendent variable. We control for a vector of player speciﬁc variables Xijt
containing, the number of games played, the number of points scored in
the previous seasons and his plus/minus-score of the previous season. The
“Plus/Minus” statistic is a player statistic to measure the contribution of a
single player to his team’s performance. The score is increased by one if a
team scores while a player is on the ice and the team is not in power play
(the other team has a penalty). It is decreased by one if the player is on the
ice and the team allows in a goal while it is not short-handed. Since 1968 the
statistic is oﬃcially compiled by the NHL. Vijt contains a measure of violent
behavior. In diﬀerent speciﬁcations we test whether penalty minutes, ﬁghts,
“ﬁghts won” and “ﬁghts not won” have signiﬁcant eﬀects on a players’ salary.
We control for year-speciﬁc eﬀects, using a season dummy variable δt. The
speciﬁcation includes an individual ﬁxed eﬀect (αi) and a team ﬁxed eﬀect
(αj) to control for unobservable, time-constant characteristics of players and
teams. The residual εijt is assumed to have the usual properties. In contrast
to Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh (1997), we can control for player and team-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in a panel setting and demonstrate that these matter for
ﬁnancial returns to ﬁghts.
3 Estimation Results
Table 1 displays the team-level summary statistics for the 30 NHL teams for
the time period 1967-2005. On average each team has 73 ﬁghts and incurs
1431 penalty minutes per season. Games won is less than 50% as there is the
possibility to tie. Table 2 summarizes the player level information. On av-
erage a player earns $1.5 million, has 2 ﬁghts and incurs 48 penalty minutes
per season.
Table 4 displays the results for the conditional logit regression, estimating
the level of team success while controlling for team penalty minutes. As ex-
pected, goals for a team during the regular season are positive and signiﬁcant
in determining playoﬀ success, however only for “getting into the playoﬀs”.
After which, the number of goals scored is not important. Similarly goals
9against is negative and signiﬁcant up until the quarter ﬁnals and then be-
comes insigniﬁcant. Most important is the percentage of games actually won
during the regular season, being positive and signiﬁcant for all levels. The
team penalty minutes is signiﬁcant and positive for all levels at the quarter
ﬁnals and above, indicating a strategic value for incurring penalties during
the regular season.
We focus next on Table 4 which runs the same estimations this time
controlling for total teams ﬁghts. An almost identical pattern is found with
respect to all of the standard success indicators as well as with ﬁght behavior.
Additional numbers of ﬁghts help in increasing the probability of advancing
all the way to the championship ﬁnals, but do not increase the chance of win-
ning the championship itself. That is reserved for the percentage of games
won during the regular season. Finally, we examine the same models with a
control for the number of ﬁghts that were clearly won by a team in Table 5.
At all team success levels (where signiﬁcant), the coeﬃcients are larger for
“ﬁghts won” than simply for “ﬁghts”. Not only does it improve the playoﬀ
chances of a team to ﬁght, but also it pays to win these ﬁghts.
On a similar note, we analyze wage determinants for individual play-
ers, taking into account the standard success indicators as well as indicators
for penalty minutes, number of ﬁghts, number of ﬁghts won, and number
of ﬁghts lost. Table 6 summarizes the wage regression results from using
controls for player position, individual and group performance, and penalty
minutes. We see that in the ﬁrst 4 OLS speciﬁcations, the number of goals
scored and the number of assists (points) is positive and signiﬁcant. Points
remain signiﬁcant even when controlling for player unobserved heterogene-
ity. The plus/minus indicator is no longer signiﬁcant when controlling for
position and/or player ﬁxed eﬀects. However, throughout all speciﬁcations,
penalty minutes are positive and signiﬁcant. In the base panel regression
with ﬁxed-eﬀects, we ﬁnd that players earn a premium of $2,577 for each
penalty minute they incur. When we disaggregate the eﬀect by position in
the last column, it appears that players who are centers (i.e. the key goal
scorers) are the only ones to gain from penalty minutes with a wage premium
of $4,783 per additional incurred minute.
We extend the same model to examine the eﬀects of ﬁghting behavior
on wages in Table 7. Here we see that in OLS ﬁghts are only signiﬁcant
once disaggregating by position. When controlling for player ﬁxed eﬀects,
on average, the number of ﬁghts are positive but are insigniﬁcant (t =1 .7).
However disaggregating by position, the wing players receive a wage premium
10of $10,940 completely driving the result. The point to keep in mind here is
that the wing player has a choice: he can either make an assist (1 point)
and earn an additional $10,930 or half a goal and make the same (1 goal =
2 points), or have a ﬁght and earn $10,940, which is even $10 more. Looking
at the OLS results disaggregating by position, a wing player who ﬁghts has
a wage penalty of $7,120. However controlling for his otherwise unobserved
very poor characteristics (which he very likely exhibits, being an “enforcer”)
he in fact earns indeed a large positive wage premium of $10,940.
Entering into a ﬁght is a risky proposition. One can “win”, “tie” or “lose”
a ﬁght. We use the subjective information supplied by fans to control for
skill and success in ﬁghting. Table 8 displays the results for our standard
player wage model when we control for “ﬁghts won”. On average in OLS, a
wing player who ﬁghts and wins the ﬁghts has an even larger wage penalty of
$11,240. However, when controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, a wing player who wins
ﬁghts earns a wage premium of $18,135. This is almost as much as the wage
premium for scoring another goal (2 points × $10,933). Here on average
it clearly pays to ﬁght and win, with the overall “ﬁghts won” eﬀect being
signiﬁcant at $13,921 even when controlling for player ﬁxed eﬀects. What
happens to players who do not achieve a “clean win”? In Table 9 we run the
same wage regressions controlling for the number of ﬁghts either “tied” or
“lost” as voted by hockey fans online. Under OLS, “ﬁghts not won” carries
a premium of $15,077, however this is being driven by defense players. Wing
players have a wage penalty of $8,978 if they ﬁght and do not win. However
when controlling for player ﬁxed eﬀects, these same wing players experience
no longer a wage penalty but a wage premium of $11,993, completely driving
the positive (yet not signiﬁcant) overall result of $10,120. One must keep in
mind that an additional ﬁght (even not having won) for a wing player adds
$11,993 to his annual wage, whereas an additional point in the form of an
assist only fetches $10,925.
Clearly it is the case that there are enormous incentives for foul play
and overt violence in the NHL at the team level, by increasing the chances of
playoﬀ success. At the individual player level, causing penalties (and thereby
penalty minutes) are a strategic tool for centers. Fighting is a specialty of the
wing players who earn substantial wage premia for this behavior. Not only
is it important to ﬁght in general, but also to win, with even higher wage
premia for “winning” a ﬁght. Perhaps one might argue that certain hockey
players are trained especially to ﬁght, and given the strategic incentive as a
wing player to protect the star center player, this behavior can be explained.
Thus these players are doing what they are trained to do, and presumably
11gain some personal pleasure themselves doing this (by revealed preference).
However, no wing player goes into a ﬁght on the ice hoping to lose, even
though the wing player still has to protect his star center player as best he
can. Therefore there is still a substantial compensating wage diﬀerential for
ﬁghting and not winning. This is consistent with the wing player showing
loyalty to his team and star player and for that, the wing player is compen-
sated by his team in the form of a wage premium.
This analysis gives to rise to some interesting policy-relevant conclusions.
If one is interested in reducing ﬁght violence in ice hockey, then the incentives
must be altered, so that it is no longer proﬁtable for players in terms of addi-
tional wages and for teams in terms of increased success in the playoﬀs. On
average, a team has 73 ﬁghts per year, corresponding to approximately 2 per
player and year. If a “ﬁght ﬁne” were introduced which would would oﬀset
any possible gain to the player, i.e. the premium of $18,135 he might gain by
“winning” the ﬁght, this would imply a total of player ﬁnes in the amount of
$1.3 million per team and year. At this point, even the best ﬁghters would
be indiﬀerent to ﬁghting. This is a substantial amount of money, as the av-
erage wage of a player during this time period is $1.5 million. Nonetheless,
there are still team incentives to allow ﬁghting even if a player were indif-
ferent, such as reaching higher levels in the playoﬀs, receiving larger tickets
sales and broadcast transmission rights etc for winning. Thus teams would
still have an incentive to collude with the violent players and simply cover
their ﬁnes. The amount of the ﬁne would have to be at least as great as the
marginal beneﬁt to the team (the expected gain equals the ﬁght contribution
to added success multiplied by all additional revenues associated with win-
ning). For argument’s sake, by setting the ﬁne at twice the wage premium for
winning a ﬁght, this would correspond to $2.6 million per team and year or
$36,000 per ﬁght. However, since 2005 there is a ﬁxed team salary cap of $39
million.3 For the ﬁnes to have their intended eﬀect, the total ﬁnes assessed
to violent players would have to be added to the salary cap, amounting to
approximately 6.7% of total gross salaries, assuming the current level of ﬁght
behavior.
3See the 2005 collective bargain agreement from the National Hockey League Player’s
Association for more details at www.nhlpa.com/CBA/2005CBA.asp.
124 Conclusion
Violence and foul play are simply a fact of life in the National Hockey League,
reﬂecting very much strategic considerations as opposed to merely “venting
oﬀ steam”. Using a unique data base of players in NHL teams 1996-2007,
and a team level database for all NHL teams 1967-2005, we examine the role
of penalty minutes and more speciﬁcally, ﬁghting, during the regular season
in determining wages for professional hockey players and team-level success
indicators. There are substantial returns paid not only to goal scoring skills
but also to ﬁghting ability, helping teams move higher in the playoﬀs and
showing up as positive wage premia for certain players.
We provide evidence for the proposition that observed low-ability wing
players are paid a substantial wage premium to protect high-ability center
players who can score goals. They do this by ﬁghting with any other opposing
player who threatens their star players, allowing the star player unfettered
scoring possibilities. At the same time, they also try to intimidate the oppos-
ing center and wing players. For this the wing players are paid a premium
of $10,940 for each ﬁght. For an additional point (i.e. an assist), they are
only paid a premium of $10,930. It pays not only to ﬁght but to win the
ﬁght. The wage premium for the wing ﬁghter who “clearly wins” the ﬁght is
almost double ($18,135) than that for ﬁghting but not winning ($11,993), i.e.
he is a “more eﬀective” enforcer and more likely to protect the star player.
However, both amounts are still greater than scoring another point (in the
form of an assist) at around $10,925.
As we have consistently found signiﬁcant OLS wage penalties for wing
players based only on observed indicators, coupled with positive and signiﬁ-
cant wage premia for the same players, controlling for unobserved individual
player heterogeneity (massive comparative advantages in ﬁghting), we con-
clude that the main mechanism behind ﬁghts is strategic. Wing players
specialize in ﬁghting skills and have comparative disadvantages in scoring
goals. Their observable characteristics are (comparatively) poor on average.
Yet they still provide valuable services to the star players by protecting them
and harassing the opposing team star players, all of which are beneﬁcial to the
own team. Not only are they paid additionally for this, the respective teams
experience higher probabilities in achieving higher standings in the playoﬀ
rounds. This is not to say that all wing players are “enforcers”. However,
given the monetary and success incentives for using violence in the NHL, it
seems unlikely that this kind of violence will disappear on its own, even given
the downward trend in ﬁghts since the 1987-88 season when the ﬁrst hockey
13ﬁghter due to his own brutality had criminal charges laid against him and
was convicted.
To reduce ﬁght violence in ice hockey, then the incentives must be altered,
so that it is no longer proﬁtable for players to ﬁght, in terms of additional
wages and for teams in terms of increased success in the playoﬀs. By introduc-
ing a “ﬁght ﬁne” of twice the maximum potential gain (2 x $18,000=$36,000
per ﬁght) that a ﬁghting player might gain and adding this amount to salaries
paid for the team salary cap introduced in 2005 (ﬁnes would be 6.7% of the
team salary cap or the average wage of 2 players), then all involved would
have either little or no incentive to allow ﬁghting to continue. Presumably,
this would also have the added beneﬁt of avoiding career-ending injuries due
to wanton violence and improve the quality of play as it would no longer to
pay to employ players explicitly for their ﬁghting skills as opposed to goal-
scoring skills.
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16Table 1: Team-Level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
PIM 1431.332 (407.756) 554 2713 780
Fights 73.017 (31.408) 6 198 780
Fights Won 36.701 (16.132) 3.8 102.96 758
Goals For 263.126 (49.369) 151 446 780
Goals Against 261.867 (52.183) 157 446 780
Games Won (Pct.) 0.435 (0.114) 0.1 0.756 780
Table 2: Player-Level Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Salary (US$) 1517677.102 (1590539.766) 99270 17000000 5571
Fights 1.969 (3.965) 0 40 5571
PIM 48.171 (41.844) 0 372 5571
Games Played 57.768 (23.569) 1 82 5571
+/- 0.507 (10.218) -42 52 5571
Points 26.353 (22.079) 0 127 5571
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20Table 6: Player Wage Eﬀects of Penalty Minutes
OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 XT 1 XT 2
Plus/Minust−1 8847.0∗∗∗ 6352.6∗∗ 3193.0 3968.0 -682.3 -535.8
(2.89) (2.58) (1.33) (1.60) (-0.22) (-0.18)
Pointst−1 44025.7∗∗∗ 43600.1∗∗∗ 47949.0∗∗∗ 46311.6∗∗∗ 10634.6∗∗∗ 10458.0∗∗∗
(21.59) (21.71) (22.09) (22.54) (5.26) (5.13)
Games played -595.4 -1021.1 -1925.8∗∗∗ -2413.6∗∗∗ -2208.3∗ -2524.8∗
(-0.83) (-1.67) (-2.81) (-3.32) (-1.98) (-2.03)
Penalty Minutes 2715.7∗∗∗ 3310.6∗∗∗ 3423.4∗∗∗ − 2577.5∗∗∗ −
(4.98) (7.02) (5.97) (3.08)
Wing −− -135197.5∗ −−−
(-2.02)
Defence −− 496493.7∗∗∗ −−−
(10.47)
Wing x PM −− − -7560.4∗∗∗ − 1224.2
(-9.56) (0.85)
Center x PM −− − -5648.8∗∗∗ − 4783.1∗∗
(-4.23) (2.19)
Defence x PM −− − 8624.8∗∗∗ − 1412.8
(8.50) (1.00)
Season FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Player FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.392 0.441 0.470 0.460 0.265 0.267
Adj.R2 0.392 0.437 0.465 0.455 0.263 0.265
N 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on team level
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
21Table 7: Player Wage Eﬀects of Fights
OLS 5 OLS 6 OLS 7 OLS 8 XT 3 XT 4
Plus/minust−1 8910.4∗∗∗ 6524.9∗∗ 3265.4 5777.3∗∗ -679.5 -676.2
(2.90) (2.60) (1.35) (2.28) (-0.22) (-0.22)
Pointst−1 42940.3∗∗∗ 42374.9∗∗∗ 47547.3∗∗∗ 43213.5∗∗∗ 10925.0∗∗∗ 10930.3∗∗∗
(22.01) (22.18) (22.61) (22.31) (5.46) (5.45)
Games played 1719.3∗∗∗ 1782.2∗∗∗ 525.1 1485.6∗∗ -257.5 -250.3
(2.94) (2.97) (0.84) (2.55) (-0.37) (-0.36)
Fights (F) -183.5 1605.8 13615.8∗∗∗ − 8886.5 −
(-0.06) (0.57) (4.10) (1.70)
Wing −− -106551.5 −−−
(-1.60)
Defence −− 534660.7∗∗∗ −−−
(11.22)
Wing x F −− − -7120.2∗∗∗ − 10940.4∗∗
(-2.88) (2.35)
Center x F −− − -31128.6∗ − 9308.2
(-1.80) (0.42)
Defence x F −− − 47726.1∗∗∗ − 4229.9
(7.11) (0.43)
Season FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Player FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.388 0.435 0.465 0.440 0.263 0.263
Adj.R2 0.388 0.431 0.460 0.436 0.261 0.261
N 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on team level
All models except ﬁrst contain season and team dummies
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
22Table 8: Player Wage Eﬀects of Fights Won
OLS 9 OLS 10 OLS 11 OLS 12 XT 5 XT 6
Plus/Minust−1 8910.8∗∗∗ 6523.2∗∗ 3244.6 6201.7∗∗ -707.4 -705.0
(2.90) (2.60) (1.33) (2.47) (-0.23) (-0.23)
Pointst−1 43072.8∗∗∗ 42381.4∗∗∗ 47323.3∗∗∗ 42747.3∗∗∗ 10920.9∗∗∗ 10933.6∗∗∗
(22.10) (22.07) (22.66) (21.94) (5.46) (5.49)
Games played 1644.6∗∗ 1783.3∗∗∗ 697.2 1678.4∗∗ -100.3 -91.25
(2.75) (2.85) (1.07) (2.70) (-0.15) (-0.13)
Fights Won (FW) 6488.4 5026.7 28097.1∗∗∗ − 13921.5∗ −
(1.48) (1.08) (5.12) (1.93)
Wing −− -103050.2 −−−
(-1.58)
Defence −− 536030.0∗∗∗ −−−
(11.27)
Wing x FW −− − -11240.2∗ − 18135.3∗∗∗
(-1.84) (2.97)
Center x FW −− − -33504.3 − -7068.2
(-1.11) (-0.13)
Defence x FW −− − 88095.3∗∗∗ − 7805.0
(4.49) (0.57)
Season FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Player FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.388 0.436 0.465 0.438 0.262 0.263
Adj.R2 0.388 0.431 0.460 0.433 0.261 0.261
N 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on team level
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
23Table 9: Player Wage Eﬀects of Fights Not Won
OLS 13 OLS 14 OLS 15 OLS 16 XT 7 XT 8
Plus/Minust−1 8905.8∗∗∗ 6523.1∗∗ 3271.8 5813.2∗∗ -666.1 -668.9
(2.90) (2.60) (1.35) (2.29) (-0.22) (-0.22)
Pointst−1 42856.1∗∗∗ 42335.4∗∗∗ 47500.9∗∗∗ 43148.7∗∗∗ 10928.0∗∗∗ 10925.6∗∗∗
(21.95) (22.13) (22.58) (22.30) (5.47) (5.43)
Games played 1770.1∗∗∗ 1808.0∗∗∗ 563.2 1521.1∗∗ -246.0 -248.5
(3.02) (3.02) (0.90) (2.63) (-0.36) (-0.36)
Fights Not Won (FNW) -1981.8 1049.0 15077.2∗∗∗ − 10120.1 −
(-0.54) (0.29) (3.60) (1.46)
Wing −− -104168.1 −−−
(-1.56)
Defence −− 534925.8∗∗∗ −−−
(11.24)
Wing x FNW −− − -8978.2∗∗∗ − 11993.5∗
(-3.16) (1.96)
Center x FNW −− − -37711.2∗ − 19671.5
(-1.95) (0.57)
Defence x FNW −− − 53556.3∗∗∗ − 3300.8
(6.68) (0.30)
Season FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Player FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.388 0.435 0.464 0.440 0.262 0.263
Adj.R2 0.388 0.431 0.460 0.435 0.261 0.261
N 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571 5571
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on team level
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
24Table 10: Teams and Person-Year Obersvations
Team Name No. %
Anaheim Mighty Ducks 409 4.2
Atlanta Thrashers 242 2.5
Boston Bruins 438 4.5
Buﬀalo Sabres 407 4.2
Calgary Flames 451 4.6
Carolina Hurricanes 269 2.7
Chicago Blackhawks 435 4.4
Colorado Avalanche 304 3.1
Columbus Blue Jackets 229 2.3
Dallas Stars 314 3.2
Detroit Red Wings 288 2.9
Edmonton Oilers 325 3.3
Florida Panthers 330 3.4
Los Angeles Kings 340 3.5
Minnesota Wild 194 2.0
Montreal Canadiens 326 3.3
Nashville Predators 275 2.8
New Jersey Devils 303 3.1
New York Islanders 355 3.6
New York Rangers 341 3.5
Ottawa Senators 309 3.2
Philadelphia Flyers 346 3.5
Phoenix Coyotes 318 3.2
Pittsburgh Penguins 318 3.2
San Jose Sharks 301 3.1
St. Louis Blues 335 3.4
Tampa Bay Lightning 310 3.2
Toronto Maple Leafs 329 3.4
Vancouver Canucks 323 3.3
Washington Capitals 342 3.5
Total 9806 100.0
25Table 11: Top 20 Enforcer
Fights Player Position
169 Ti´ e Domi Wing
160 Krzysztof Oliwa Wing
159 Ian Laperriere Center
154 Jeﬀ Odgers Wing
147 Donald Brashear Wing
141 Peter Worrell Wing
131 Matt Johnson Wing
123 Paul Laus Defence
122 Matthew Barnaby Wing
120 Georges Laraque Wing
119 Jody Shelley Wing
113 Jim McKenzie Wing
110 Denny Lambert Wing
105 Darren Langdon Wing
105 Rob Ray Wing
99 Bob Boughner Defence
98 Eric Cairns Defence
96 Kelly Buchberger Wing
94 Andrei Nazarov Wing
92 Andre Roy Wing
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Figure 1: Development of Penalty Minutes on Team Level
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Figure 2: Distribution of Penalty Minutes
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Figure 3: Development of Fights on Team Level
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Figure 4: Distribution of Fights
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